including pharmaceuticals and medical devices, but it actually consists of more than 200 separately operating companies-some with more than US$1 billion in annual revenue (totaling more than US$42 billion annually for the entire corporation), and others that are very small (performing focused research, marketing, or other tasks). Tying together this diverse business environment is a security foundation built on public-key infrastructure (PKI) technology, coupled with an enterprise-wide identity directory.
In this article, we describe that infrastructure, Johnson & Johnson's experience in deploying it, and how the company uses (and plans to use) digital certificates. Most important, we'll outline some real-world lessons the company learned when deploying PKI.
Fitting PKI with the company's goals
Johnson & Johnson's information management environment is as large and diverse as its business environment. Its Web site (www.jnj.com) gets approximately four million page views per month; additionally, there are more than 400 Web sites throughout the company that serve the companies it owns. The network backbone is supported by Windows 2000, and the desktop and laptop environment has also been standardized on Windows 2000 Professional. Outlook 2000 is the company's standard email client, with over 50 million emails exchanged monthly. More than 60,000 of Johnson & Johnson's 110,000 employees require secure remote access. Historically, two-factor authentication with RSA SecurID dynamic PIN tokens made such access possible; beginning in 2003, remote users began using PKI hardware tokens, which we'll detail later.
The company recognized that while its business needs were diverse, its desire to become the "best connected healthcare company" pointed to certain common characteristics that security infrastructures require-specifically, strong authentication for network access and, when needed, application access; the ability to protect (through encryption) sensitive business information, especially when doing business via the Internet; the ability to make legally binding electronic signatures; and the ability to ensure data integrity. These needs had to be met not only across the spectrum of operating companies, but also with government regulators, business partners, and customers. After considering several options, we found that only PKI technology had the ability to meet all these needsspecifically, the use of PKI-issued X.509 digital certificates.
A PKI, in simple terms, is a technical infrastructure that issues users electronic credentials called digital certificates. These certificates are unspoofable because they're digitally signed by a certification authority (CA) that Johnson & Johnson manages under very tight control to ensure it issues credentials only to those authorized to receive them. Associated with each digital certificate is a private key on a hardware token. With certificates used for authentication and digital signatures, only the subscriber-the person named in the digital certificatepossesses the private key. This makes identity theft (impersonation) extremely difficult: no longer does stealing a password suffice.
After testing a pilot version in 1999, the company decided in December 2000 to plan for and execute an enterprise-wide PKI deployment, which it planned to build and run itself rather than relying on an outsourced solution. 
Constructing the PKI
Building a PKI entails two separate processes: establishing a trustworthy source for the identities that will be placed into the certificates, and then ensuring that the certificates are created and provided to the people for whom they are intended.
Identity management framework
As a first step in constructing the PKI, Johnson & Johnson recognized that it had to provide a common identity management framework for employees, contractors, and business partners. With over 200 operating companies around the world, it was imperative that there be a single, master identity directory. This Enterprise Directory (ED) had to provide the identifying information that could be meaningfully employed in issuing certificates. The company selected Active Directory (AD) as the tool for this purpose. The ED is in a separate forest from the network operating system (NOS) AD (that is, the two are completely separate instantiations of AD, tied together only as we direct them to be, with some information from the latter populating the former). Separating the ED from the NOS AD (which has hundreds of copies) let us substantially limit the number of system administrators that needed access to the ED. That enhances security by reducing the opportunity for a malicious insider to subvert the ED. The ED contains more than 300,000 entries for current and former employees and partners, retirees, and former partners, and is replicated on seven servers around the world to provide the load balancing and redundancy necessary for a company with global operations.
The ED operation is premised on authoritative sources that describe who or what is permitted to enter information into the directory. For example, entering a new employee into the ED requires the operating company's human resources (HR) system to provide identity information. Other authoritative sources are Johnson & Johnson's Microsoft Exchange directory for email addresses; its PKI CA for certificates; and its employees (once the HR system enters them) for their own business contact information. The system assigns each ED entry a numbercalled a World Wide Identifier or WWID-that serves to ensure uniqueness across the entire enterprise, and over time. No WWID is ever reused; each is unique.
Issuing certificates
Information placed into the certificates comes directly from the EDsubscribers are not permitted to select what will or won't go into their certificates. Each certificate actually contains three "identifiers" for the subject: the individual's full X.500 distinguished name (DN), which includes the individual's WWID, common name, and email address; the individual's email address in the subjAltName field, in the format specified by the Internet Engineering Task Force's RFC 822 (the fact that the email address appears twice is deliberate redundancy to support application programs); and the subject's "universal principal name," which includes their Windows 2000 logon ID.
Each subscriber receives two certificates: one for digital signatures and authentication and the other for encryption. The signature key pair is generated on a hardware token, so that there is no way to make a copy of the private key or export one from the hardware token. The encryption key pair is generated at the CA, and the private key is escrowed for business "key recovery" purposes (that is, to ensure that data encrypted in the corresponding public key can be recovered if a user loses his or her private key). Each employee certificate is valid for five years; those for partners are valid for up to two years. These requirements, and many others, are captured in the Certificate Policy (prepared pursuant to RFC 2527-prescribing the content and format of such a document-and shortly to be updated to RFC 3647, which replaces RFC 2527), and in the Certification Practices Statement, both of which are part of the PKI policy framework. Johnson & Johnson recognized that public-key technology is not a PKI until that policy framework is firmly established. Such a framework ensures that the certificates issued by the PKI are legally defensible-with regulators, and in a court of law.
The process of getting a certifi-
As a first step in constructing the PKI, Johnson & Johnson recognized that it had to provide a common identity management framework for employees, contractors, and business partners.
cate is straightforward. A subscriber is first placed into the ED using one of the processes mentioned earlier.
The subscriber then requests that a certificate be issued; this triggers two emails, one to the subscriber containing a private code, and one to the subscriber's supervisor (as listed in the ED) containing a different private code. The supervisor contacts the subscriber and before giving him or her the second private code, goes through a person-to-person IDproofing event to ensure that the code is given to the right person.
Using both codes and a blank hardware token, the subscriber registers for and receives the two certificates.
Johnson & Johnson used a modified version of this process during a large-scale initial rollout of certificates that began in 2003. Under tight controls, the CA-generated certificates and tokens were prepopulated with employee identities. We then distributed the tokens-also under tight controls-to the proper recipients.
Hardware
Johnson & Johnson selected the Rainbow Technologies iKey 2032 USB as its hardware token. The tokens are set to operate in a fashion (called FIPS 140 level-2 mode) that meets stringent government standards. Each key has a private key inserted on it at the factory that brands them as Johnson & Johnson tokens. This latter step provides additional control to ensure that only Johnson & Johnson tokens can receive company certificates, and helps ensure that keys for hardware certificates are generated on hardware tokens. To use a hardware token, a user must authenticate himself or herself to the token with a passphrase (not to be confused with a password). Users can attempt to authenticate only a certain number of times; after five sequential failed attempts, the token locks and the keying material is lost and cannot be accessed in any fashion, necessitating reinitialization and new certificates.
Although certificate distribution actually began in 2001, the biggest impetus for a larger rollout was to support remote-access users when their SecurID tokens began expiring in 2003. By the end of that year, more than 50,000 tokens had been deployed; as of July 2004, that number has grown to more than 58,000 and is expected to reach more than 60,000 by the end of this year. Johnson & Johnson has issued more than 160,000 certificates to support this effort.
Challenges
As with any large-scale deployment of a new technology, Johnson & Johnson encountered challenges-a euphemism for problems-each of which the company overcame, but each of which resulted in valuable lessons learned.
• Shifting user paradigms. Users familiar with the customary user ID and password combination required to perform most operations (or the slightly more complicated SecurID for remote access) were not used to inserting an identity token into their laptops or desktops to perform operations. Although we deliberately called the string that users employ to authenticate to the token a "passphrase," some users still confused that with their network passwords, resulting in a few locked tokens. Our lesson learned: it is almost impossible to overemphasize to users how their environment and standard operations will change when they get new technology.
• Helping the help desks. Johnson & Johnson has several help desks around the world, aimed (of course) at helping users who have problems accessing the network, using their laptops or desktops, and so on. Although we diligently prepared material for help-desk personnel in anticipation of the numerous questions they would field during and immediately after the deployment, the number of such inquiries was substantially higher than anticipated. One reason was that many users were so accustomed to calling the help desk that they didn't read the provided instructions as part of the rollout, instead opting just to "call home" for help. The good news was that the "spike" had a relatively short half-life-weeks in some cases, months in others. Microsoft, the RSA BSafe keystore, the Oracle "Wallet," all of which hold certificates and either private keys or pointers to where private keys are located on hardware tokens). Our lesson learned: users must understand that identity credential changes have many consequences. This is no different in concept from getting new credit cards, for example, and then having to register the new ones for automatic bill payment.
• CRL caching behavior. We publish our CRLs daily with a seven-day "nextUpdate" period (so that client software knows to expect that a new CRL will be published within seven days of the date that the current CRL was published). We do this to afford ample opportunity to recover from online CA problems. We didn't understand until after deployment that CRLs are cached using the Internet Explorer "temporary Internet files" folder functionality. Our standard setting is to flush that folder whenever IE closes, or whenever a laptop shuts down. This means that Outlook might download our large CRL to help verify an email's digital signature, for example, and then the next day, or even later in the same day (if the user had opened and closed IE), Outlook would need to download it again. Needless to say, remote users with limited bandwidth were not happy. We cured this by apprising them to turn off the "flush TIE folder" setting. The good news is that future versions of CAPI will manage their own CRL cache based on the "nextUpdate" field. Our lesson learned: be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
• Language barriers. Johnson & John-
son's official language is English, and although its employees speak dozens of other languages, English is generally used for business purposes. To obtain certificates, each subscriber had to sign an agreement reciting his or her obligation to protect the private key and use it only for business purposes. The agreement was in English-but to be binding, some countries required that it be in the native language, even if the subscriber speaks English. Additionally, training materials had to be produced in multiple languages to meet local government regulations-again, even though subscribers speak English. Our lesson learned: when you operate internationally, English might be your official business lan-guage, but often it cannot be your only information-management language.
J
ohnson & Johnson surmounted all these challenges and more without inordinate cost or effort. We're confident that even more challenges lie ahead, but we're equally confident that they, too, will be met. Our focus now is to ensure that the X.509 certificates' full power and utility are realized. This can be done only by ensuring that there are ample opportunities for the certificates' use-opportunities that add real business value, including meeting applicable government regulatory requirements. Currently, certificates are used for remote access, secure email (encrypted/ signed email for sensitive business information or private data), authentication to several Web-based applications (such as client-side SSL), and some applications in which digital signatures have replaced handwritten signatures.
Within Johnson & Johnson's family of companies, one of the early adopters of PKI technology was Independence Technology, which manufactures and sells the iBOT mobility product that uses technology to climb stairs and raise the patient to eye level-things a standard wheelchair cannot do. Independence Technology uses secure (encrypted) email with Johnson & Johnson certificates both internally and with several business partners that collaborate to sell, finance, and service the iBOT product.
Other early adopters within Johnson & Johnson are using signed emails with the FDA to manage pharmaceutical label content (a very important topic for patients) and to report patient experience with drug and medical device use. The prospects for vastly increased use in this space are substantial. Perhaps the most promising involve the use of digital signatures as part of drug or device clinical trials, which can involve tens of thousands of patients and thousands of clinical researchers. Historically, tons of paper (clinical trial protocols, procedures, and results) were generated and shipped for review preparatory to drug companies seeking FDA approval. With digital signatures-and encryption, where needed-the entire process can be shortened significantly. While this translates into increased revenues, it also has other important effects, such as getting drugs or medical devices into patients' hands more quickly. This means improving patients' medical conditions-always a desirable outcome.
Finally, Johnson & Johnson is working closely with Microsoft, Adobe, Oracle, SAP, PeopleSoft, and other major software vendors to ensure that applications ranging from enterprise resource planning to productivity suites can use digital certificates. The good news is that many of these applications already do; the even better news is that much more is in the works.
Some have said that PKI is either dead or moribund. As Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) observed on hearing reports of his death, "Those reports are greatly exaggerated." PKI is alive, well, and growing-not only in the healthcare sector, but in others, including aerospace, higher education, government, banking, and, of course, the military. And the future is even brighter as global companies seek to work more closely with their partners and customers electronically, with PKI supplying the electronic credentials that can be used across enterprises to uniquely identify individuals in a secure and legally binding fashion. 
